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JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES AND THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT OF 1947-PART 11*
CHARLES W. HEIDENREICH**
PRIVATE SETTLEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
In our previous discussion of the procedural aspects of the right of
the National Labor Relations Board to hear and determine jurisdiction-
al disputes under section 10(k) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, we emphasized the importance of a voluntary adjustment,
or an agreement by the parties to adjust, suchdisputes. We observed
that the primary purpose of section 10(k) was to encourage private,
rather than governmental, settlement of jurisdictional disputes. We
should again refer to the language of section 10(k) pertaining to vol-
untary settlement. 244 It provides that "satisfactory evidence" of the
existence of an agreement among the parties to a jurisdictional dispute
to resolve their problem without governmental intervention is sufficient
to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations
Board under section 10(k). We have also seen that an actual adjustment
of a jurisdictional dispute by the parties would not only prevent the
Board from exercising jurisdiction to hear and determine the dispute
under section 10(k) but also cause a dismissal of the charge of an un-
fair labor practice as proscribed by section 8(b) (4) (D) of the 1947
Act. 24 5
It seems impossible to overstress the importance of a statutory pro-
vision which compels a federal administrative agency to refuse jurisdic-
tion in a case involving an alleged violation of the National Labor
Relations Act where there is reason to believe that the disputants have
entered into an agreement to settle their own difficulties and which
compels the agency to dismiss the unfair labor practice charge itself if
*Ed. Note. This article is the concluding portion of a two-part series. Part one
appeared in 45 Marq. L. Rev. 143 (1961).
**Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, College of St.
Thomas; B.S.L., LL.B., LL.M., University of Minnesota Law School.
244 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 10(k), 29 U.S.C. §160(k)
(1958) provides in part: "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged
in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of sec-
tion 8(b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the
dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless,
within, ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to
such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted,
or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute."
[Italics supplied.]
245 Supra note 244, also provides in part: "Upon compliance by the parties to the
dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjust nent of
the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed." [Italics supplied.]
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the parties have actually settled their own case. It is quite clear that
Congress by its choice of language in section 10(k) considered volun-
tary settlement of a jurisdictional dispute by the disputants the equiva-
lent of a determination by the National Labor Relations Board; in fact,
by allowing the parties ten days to.present, to the satisfaction of the
Board, evidence that they have arrived at a method of private settle-
ment, thq Act clearly puts primary emphasis on voluntary negotiation
and settlement rather than settlement by government since "satisfactory
evidence" of such voluntary agreement requires that the Board relin-
guish jurisdiction which has been invoked by one or more of the parties.
The Board also agrees with this interpretation of the statutory law and
considers the primary purpose of section 10(k) to be the encouragement
of private, and not governmental, settlement of jurisdictional disputes. 2 6
In citing the Congressional Record, 247 the Board has stated its position
as follows: "Clearly, the purpose of these provisions (section 10(k))
was to provide the parties with an, opportunity to settle jurisdictional
disputes among themselves without government intervention whenever
possible. ' 248 In another case, the Board recognized that "where there
is an agreed upon method of private adjustment, the parties themselves
have supplied the' forum for hearing and determining the dispute. '249
And, even though the jurisdictional dispute involves a violation of the
National Labor Relations Act, the Board has emphasized the priority
of voluntary settlement as follows: "Section 10(k) necessarily assumes
the existence of activities prohibited by Section 8(b) (4) (D), but never-
theless clearly provides for the voluntary settlement of jurisdictional
difference without government intervention. ' 250 Perhaps the most im-
portant statement concerning the relative status of an agreement by the
parties to settle their jurisdictional controversy was that enunciated by
the Board in the Newark & Essex Plastering Company case :251 "The
legislative history of the Act shows that in enacting sections 8(b) (4)
(D) and 10(k), Congress had three broad objectives in view. These
246 See, Local 25, Iron Workers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co.) 125 N.L.R.B. 1035, 45 L.R.R.M. 1221 (1959); Local 1102, Millwrights
Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Don Cartage Co.) 121 N.L.R.B. 101, 42 L.R.R.M. 1295
(1958) ; Local 2, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Acoustical Contractors Assn.
of Cleveland) 119 N.L.R.B. 1345, 41 L.R.R.M. 1293 (1958); Local 1, Sheet
Metal Workers Union, (Meyer Furnace Co.) 114 N.L.R.B. 924, 37 L.R.R.M.
1068 (1955) ; Local 9, Lathers Union, A.F.L., (A. W. Lee, Inc.) 113 N.L.R.B.
947, 36 L.R.R.M. 1414 (1955).
24793 CONG. REc. 4155 (1947).
248 Local 943, Carpenters Union, A.F.L., (Manhattan Construction Co.) 96
N.L.R.B. 1045, 29 L.R.R.M. 1002 (1952), petition for review denied, 198 F. 2d
230 (10th Cir. 1952), 30 L.R.R.M. 2464 (1952).
249Local 2, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Acoustical Contractors Assn. of
Cleveland), supra note 246, 41 L.R.R.M. at 1299.250 Local 1102, Millwrights Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Don Cartage Co.), supra note
246, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1296.
251 Local 173, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Newark & Essex Plastering Co.)
121 N.L.R.B. 1094, 42 L.R.R.M. 1519 (1958).
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were: (1) to encourage the settlement of jurisdictional differences with-
out Government intervention; (2) to empower this Board to determine
disputes not resolved by private arbitration, and thus avoid complaint
proceedings; and (3) to outlaw jurisdictional strikes in the interest of
neutral employers and the public. '252
Since we have considered in Part One the procedural effect of the
private settlement of jurisdictional disputes, it is our present concern
to analyze the substantive law involving such voluntary settlements.
Our immediate objective, therefore, is to consider the type of agreement
which would satisfy the National Labor Relations Board that the parties
have agreed upon a method or procedure for settling their jurisdictional
dispute. Although the Board has endeavored to encourage the private
adjustment of jurisdictional problems, and thereby promote the legisla-
tive purpose of section 10(k), it has nevertheless developed through
its decisions certain definite principles to guide itself in determining
whether the evidence supports a finding that either an actual adjustment,
or an agreement to adjust, exists. First, the Board determines if there
is an express or implied manifestation of an intention to settle a jur-
isdictional dispute by private, rather than governmental, means. Second,
the Board insists, if such an agreement exists, that all parties to the
jurisdictional dispute be also parties to the agreement of settlement.
Agreements for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes may involve
specific existing disputes, or they may prescribe certain arbitration
procedure for the settlement of future jurisdictional disputes. The most
recent plan for settling future jurisdictional controversies was that ap-
proved at the A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention in December, 1961.253 A more
limited plan covering the construction trades has been in existence since
1948, and is the most prominent agreed upon method recognized and
approved by the National Labor Relations Board.2 4 The Board has
held that the plan of the Building and Construction Trades Department
252 Id. 42 L.R.R.M. at 1521.
253 "The plan approved by the convention is in form of amendments to the AFL-
CIO constitution and will be effective until the next AFL-CIO convention in
1963 when it may be revised in light of experience with its operation. As
aproved, the plan calls for these steps. An opportunity will be given the dis-
puting unions to come to a voluntary settlement. Failing that, the AFL-CIO
president will appoint a mediator from within labor's ranks to hear the dis-
pute .... If a settlement is not reached within 14 days an impartial umpire
will move into the case. . . . An umpire's determination may be appealed
within five days to a subcommittee of the executive council .... If the sub-
committee sees substance in the appeal it turns the case over to the federa-
tion's executive council .... If an umpire's determination is not appealed or
is upheld on appeal to the executive council, the unions involved are required
to comply with the decision .... If the council members find that the charged
union has not complied with an umpire's determination, a program of quaran-
tine could be invoked." 49 Labor Relations Reporter 193, 194, Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc., Wash., D.C.
254 This Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes was approved by the
Building and Construction Trades Department, A.F.L.-C.I.O., May 1, 1948.
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of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. which set up a private tribunal, called the National
Joint Board, for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes constitutes
"satisfactory evidence" of an agreed upon method within the meaning
of section 10(k) .255 But, to be acceptable, the agreement need not be
either national or regional in scope. It can be applicable to a specific
employer exclusively. Thus, in the Win. F. Traylor case,256 the Board
approved, as a sufficient agreed upon method, an agreement between
an employer and a union providing for a determination of work assign-
ments by the business representatives of the unions involved if such
work was within the jurisdictional territory of more than one local
union.
Although the parties may have at one time entered into an agree-
ment to settle future jurisdictional disputes, to effectively forestall the
exercise of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board to hear
and determine such disputes under section 10(k), the agreement must
either be in existence at the time the charge of an 8(b) (4) (D) viola-
tion is filed with the Board's regional director or be in existence within
ten days thereafter. Thus, in a recent case, 257 the Board found that a
contract, in which it was alleged the employer had agreed to submit
jurisdictional disputes to the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board for settlement,
had expired before the jurisdictional dispute occurred and had not been
renewed. Similarly, in another case,2 58 the Board held: "We find that
the Employer and Local 12 have, through mutual inaction, abandoned
their 1955 agreement. It follows that the Employer is not currently
bound to an agreed upon method for the adjustment of this dispute, and
the statutory prohibition to our determination of the dispute is inappli-
cable. ' 259 It is, of course, consistent with the law of contracts that
parties may not only enter into agreements but may rescind such agree-
ments as well. Therefore, an agreement to submit future jurisdictional
255 Probably the most important early case on this point is the Manhattan Con-
struction Company case, supra note 248; in citing this case, the NLRB has
said: "Consistent -with the statutory provisions for private settlement of jur-
isdictional disputes whenever possible, the joint Board was established with
the knowledge of this Board, for the purpose of considering and deciding
jurisdictional disputes in the building and construction industry. We have held
that where all parties to a dispute i.e., the disputing unions and the employer
responsible for the assignment of the disputed work, are bound by the agree-
ment which established the joint Board and which provides for the submis-
sion of dispute to it, the parties have 'agreed upon methods for the voluntary
adjustment of the dispute' within the meaning of Section 10(k), and that we
are therefore without authority to determine the dispute." Local 9, Lathers
Union, A.F.L., (A. W. Lee, Inc.), supra note 246, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1415.
256 Local 236, Teamsters Union, (Win. F. Traylor) 97 N.L.R.B. 1003, 29 L.R.R.M.
1188 (1952).
257 Local 59, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Jacksonville Tile Co.) 125 N.L.R.B.
No. 13, 45 L.R.R.M. 1066 (1959).
258 Local 12, Operating Engineers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (West Coast Masonry
Contractors, Inc.) 120 N.L.R.B. 53, 41 L.R.R.M. 1413.
259 Id. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1414.
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disputes to private arbitration may either be rescinded or abandoned
and be ineffective for the purpose of depriving the National Labor
Relations Board of its jurisdiction to hear and determine a jurisdictional
dispute under section 10(k).
It can readily be seen that the determination of the existence of an
agreement among parties to settle their own jurisdictional dispute is
necessarily related to the Board's requirement that such an agreement
must include all the parties to ithe dispute. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board has continually insisted that evidence of an agreement for
the private settlement of a jurisdictional dispute is not "satisfactory"
within the meaning of section 10(k) if any one of the parties to the
dispute is not a party to the agreement. 260 A jurisdictional dispute in-
volves, at the very least, three parties, namely, the employer and two
competing groups of workers seeking the assignment of the work in
dispute. Of course, if three different groups are seeking an assignment
of jurisdictionally disputed work, four parties are necessary to an effec-
tive voluntary settlement, and so on. It is apparent, therefore, that an
agreed upon method for the private settlement of a jurisdictional dis-
pute cannot be within the contemplation of section 10(k) if the settle-
ment procedure involves the disputing unions and not the employer or
if it involves the employer and only one of the disputing unions. The
Kansas City Power & Light Company case261 presents an interesting
set of circumstances which the Board found did not reveal participation
by all the parties in an agreement to adjust their jurisdictional dispute.
The dispute involved an assignment by the employer, a public utility
company, of steam pipe installation to members of the Electrical Work-
ers Union (I.B.E.W.). The Pipefitters Union contested the assignment
and was subsequently charged with a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D).
Because of the strike, the City, for whom the pipe was being installed,
gave the job to another company, using members of the Pipefitters
Union. Before the National Labor Relations Board had exercised jur-
isdiction under section 10(k) to hear the dispute, as being jurisdictional
in character, the respondent union charged with the violation of section
8(b) (4) (D) sent a letter to the Board's regional director stating that
"it was not lawfully entitled to force or require the Company to assign
the work of tying steam pipe to its members (and that) it will not
induce or encourage employees to strike in order to force such assign-
ment." The language used in the letter was substantially that used by
260 Some recent cases include: Operating Engineers Union, (Fluoro Electric Cor-
poration) 128 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 46 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1960); Local 25, Iron
Workers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.), supra note 246;
Local 1102, Millwrights Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (General Riggers & Erectors,
Inc.) 127 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 45 L.R.R.M. 1494 (1960).
261 Local 533, Plumbers and Pipefitters Union, (Kansas City Power & Light Co.)
115 N.L.R.B. 1411, 38 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1956).
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the National Labor Relations Board in its 10(k) determinations against
unions which it finds reasonably charged with an 8(b) (4) (D) viola-
tion., The respondent union claimed that it had "taken all the action
required under the law" and that the Board had no jurisdiction to de-
termine the dispute under section 10(k). The Board agreed with the
Company "that the letter . . . constituted neither satisfactory evidence
that the partied have adjusted or agreed upon methods for adjustment
nor an informal settlement (since) the letter was a unilateral declara-
tion not accepted by the Company or the IBEW and not approved by
the Regional Director. ' 26 2 The Board was not impressed with the
efforts of a union, charged with forcing an assignment of work, to
settle the dispute after it had been successful in obtaining the work.
263
The question of proper parties to a private arbitration procedure
was involved in a recent case-Food Employers' Council, Inc. 264 The
case inolved an agreement between the Retail Clerks Union and an
association of food store owners-the Employers' Council-concerning
"shelving" work. The work of replenishing the shelves and racks in
the various food stores was being performed by employees of the com-
panies supplying the stores and by members of the Teamsters Union.
The Retail Clerks Union claimed that "shelving" was within its con-
tract with the Employers' Council. The contract between the Clerks and
the Council contained an arbitration clause-an agreement by the parties
to submit contractual disputes to private arbitration. The National Labor
Relations Board, in a three to two decision, disagreed with the Clerks'
interpretation of this clause. The members of the majority stated: "The
argument of the Clerks that the agreement to arbitrate need include
only itself and'the Council is based upon the contention .. .that the
dispute is exclusively concerned with the meaning to be given to the
recognition and work assignment clauses of the ... agreement."26 The
majority then went on to state that even if the Clerks' Union agreed to
submit its claim to arbitration under its agreement with the Employers'
262 Id. 38 L.R.R.M. at 1082. [Italics supplied.]
263 The Board noted: "[T]he Respondent's efforts were successful; the Company
lost the contract; and the Respondent did secure the work assignment. Then
at the very last moment, immediately before the hearing in this proceeding
came to order, the Respondent submitted a letter to the Regional Director
stating that it will not violate Section 8(b) (4) (D). We would be short
sighted indeed and remiss in our responsibility under the statute were we to
accept that document as a settlement. To terminate this proceeding at this
stage without a determination would leave the Board with the possibility of
again facing a last minute effort to forestall Board action at some time in the
future. Under the circumstances we believe that the policies of the Act and
the direction of section 10(k) impel that we make findings of fact and issue
a Determination of Dispute in this proceeding." Local 533, Plumbers and
Pipefitters Union, (Kansas City Power & Light Co.) supra note 261, 38
L.R.R.M. at 1083.
264Local 770, Retail Clerks Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., et al. (Food Employers' Coin-
cil, Inc.) 125 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 45 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1959).
265 Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1196.
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Council, the Board would nonetheless be compelled to decide the ques-
tion concerning the Clerks' right to force a re-assignment of the work
in dispute. The majority went on to hold: "This is a statutory problem
which only the Board is qualified to pass upon. The Council and the
Clerks may be essential parties in determining whether there has been
a violation of the agreement,, but the Teamsters and the suppliers are
equally essential parties to the voluntary method of adjustment contem-
plated in Section 10(k). Without their consent to participate in an arbi-
tration proceeding, there can be no effectual voluntary settlement of the
dispute. ' 263 The Board's dissenting members, however, thought that the
contract between the Retail Clerks' Union and the Employers' Council,
providing for the arbitration of their contractual disputes, was control-
ling. The minority opinion in the Food Employers' Council case was
expreessed as follows:
The Board has long recognized the value, in its disposition of
jurisdictional disputes, of requiring parties to adhere to their
agreements by denying relief under Section 10(k) to an employer
who has assigned work to one group of employees in derogation
of the unambiguous assignment of that work to another group of
employees by contract. 267 . . . But now the Board refuses to take
the next step, which is essential to the logic of its position-
that a contract which provides for final and binding arbitration
of its meaning is not an ambiguous contract. . . . The parties
provided a method of self-governance) in their contract through
the grievance and arbitration procedures . . ., even to the extent
of agreeing on means for determining whether a particular dis-
pute is arbitrable.
268
The majority of the Board members in the -Food Employers' Council
case replied to the dissenting position as follows:
Our dissenting colleagues would find that the Clerks-Council
agreement is a defense to the charges (of an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair
labor practice) because its ambiguous work assignment provi-
sions are susceptible to eventual determination through arbitra-
tion and are, therefore, potentially unambiguous. They would
treat an admittedly ambiguous work assignment clause with the
same effect as a Board order or certification for purposes of
266 Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1196, 1197. At this point, in note 4, the Board cites in sup-
port of its statements the following cases: Local 173, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-
C.I.O., (Newark & Essex Plastering Co.), supra note 251; Local 1102, Mill-
wrights Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Don Cartage Co.), supra note 246; and Local
2, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Acoustical Contractors Assn. of Cleveland),
supra note 246.
267 At this point, in note 7, the dissenting opinion cites as authority the follow-
ing cases: National Assn. of Broadcast Engineers & Technicians (N.B.C. Inc.)
105 N.L.R.B. 355, 32 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1953); Local 1212, I.B.E.W., (C.B.S.
Inc.) 114 N.L.R.B. 1354, 37 L.R.R.M. 1164 (1955); Local 48, Sheet Metal
Workers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Gadsden Heating & Sheet Metal Co.) 119
N.L.R.B. 387, 41 L.R.R.M. 1047 (1957).
26845 L.R.R.M. at 1199, 1200.
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exoneration, if the meaning of the clauses can be arbitrated. The
members of the majority, on the other hand, believe that a con-
tractual provision for arbitration constitutes an agreed upon
method for the voluntary adjustment of a work assignment dis-
pute under Section 10(k), and may be a defense to Section
8(b) (4) (D) charges only when all the parties to the dispute have
agreed to be bound by such method. . . . We believe that our
view of the effect to be given an agreement to arbitrate in a
work assignment dispute, i.e., the necessity that all parties be
bound, is preferable to that of our dissenting colleagues because
we are of the opinion that in this respect arbitration to settle the
meaning of an ambiguous work assignment clause should be
treated like arbitration to settle conflicting claims arising there-
under. In both cases, the arbitration procedure is ineffective
unless all parties having an interest in the outcome of the dispute
agree to be bound.
269
The issue debated by the majority and dissenting members of the
National Labor Relations Board in the Food Employers' Council case
is indeed an important one. It involves not only the question of proper
parties to an agreement to settle a jurisdictional dispute within the
meaning of section 10(k) but also the related question of whether a
union claiming a contractual right to jurisdictionally disputed work can
have its claim settled according to arbitration procedure set forth in
its contract with the employer without the participation of the other
group or groups claiming a right to the work. The real difference be-
tween the majority and minority views concerns the nature of the prob-
lem. Is it essentially a statutory problem? Or, is it essentially con-
tractual? If the charge of conduct in violation of the jurisdictional
dispute provisions of- section 8(b) (4) (D) is emphasized, the problem
is then a statutory one. If, however, the interpretative and arbitrable
characteristics of the claim of the Retail Clerks Union is emphasized,
the problem is essentially contractual-involving the application of the
terms of a contract between the parties concerned. The majority in the
Food Employers' Council case decides in favor of the statutory view.
The dissenting members of the Board recognize that there "is an over-
lap between statutory and contractual rights" but feel that the problem
"should be settled wholly by resort to the contract itself." 270
In support of its contention in the Food Employers' Council case that
the claim of the Retail Clerks Union should be resolved according to the
arbitration procedure prescribed in its contract with the Employers'
Council, the minority opinion cites as authority the Board's refusal "to
remedy the statutory violation" in other cases involving allegations of
"violations of Section 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) which arise from conduct
that may also be considered a contract violation.., if the grievance and
269 Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1198, n. 5.
270 Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1200.
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arbitration procedures of the contract have not been invoked. ' 27 1 The
dissenting Board members then conclude that they would "uphold the
validity of an agreement to arbitrate, even when the charging party is
thereby denied the immediate protection of a Section 10(k) determina-
tion. ' 272 But, if a union involved in a dispute with another union over
an assignment of work bases its claim to the disputed work on a con-
tract with the employer and then contends that the dispute should be
settled according to the arbitration procedure set forth in is contract
with the employer, what about the right of the other union to present,
for consideration by the employer, its claim to the disputed work? It
would seem, therefore, that the National Labor Relations Board's
preference for private arbitration procedure in cases involving the
conduct of an employer which is alleged to be violative of certain statu-
tory provisions as well as a union's contractual rights would not be
applicable in jurisdictional dispute cases. If, for example, an employer's
conduct encourages or discourages union membership in violation of
section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, or his conduct
amounts to a refusal to bargain with a union in violation of section
8(a) (5), and the employer's conduct in either of these situations is
also in violation of the particular union's contract with the employer,
then the Board could, by invoking the arbitration procedure prescribed
in the contract, settle the statutory violation as well as the parties' con-
tractual differences without the necessity of resorting to government
intervention. This can be stated in another way. Violations of the Act
by the employer which involve either the statutory sections cited by
the dissent in the Food Employer's Council case, and which also involve
a contractual violation, result in a controversy between the particular
union and the employer. The controversy is not a three-party affair as
is the jurisdictional dispute. Thus, an act of an employer which a union
charges to be in violation of its contractual, as well as its statutory,
rights could be settled by the National Labor Relations Board only after
the union has exhausted its primary remedy of private arbitration set
forth in its contract. However, if the charge of a statutory violation
involves union conduct proscribed by section 8(b) (4) (D), it would not
be proper to utilize the arbitration machinery set forth in the contract
between such union and the employer to the exclusion of any other
union or group asserting a claim to the disputed work. Therefore,
despite the fact that one of two contending groups seeking an assign-
ment of jurisdictionally disputed work claims its dispute is contractual
and subject to arbitration within the terms of its contract with the
employer, the problem to be resolved in a jurisdictional dispute is
essentially statutory, if the dispute has been the cause of conduct by
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
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either of the competing groups to force the employer to assign the work
in violation of section 8(b) (4) (D). Such a problem is statutory not
merely because it involves an alleged violation of section 8(b) (4) (D)
but because the charge of an 8(b) (4) (D) violation requires the initial
applicability of section 10(k) which provides for a hearing and deter-
mination of the basic jurisdictional dispute by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, if all the parties to the dispute have not agreed upon their
own method of settlement.
We agree, then, with the view that if the contract between an em-
ployer and a union does not clearly assign jurisdictionally disputed
work to one of the contending unions, all interested parties must be
represented in an agreement to arbitrate. It was to this point that the
majority opinion in the Food Employers' Council case referred when
it stated that "arbitration to settle the meaning of an ambiguous work-
assignment clause should be treated like arbitration to settle the conflict-
ing claims arising thereunder." 273 The majority opinion went on to con-
clude that "arbitration procedure is ineffective unless all parties having
an interest in the outcome of the dispute agree to be bound." 274 This
means, of course, that as far as jurisdictional disputes are concerned
the arbitration procedure specified in a contract between an employer and
one of the disputing unions is not "satisfactory evidence" of an agreed
upon method of private settlement within the meaning of section 10(k)
unless the other disputing group or union is also a participant in such
procedure.
It should be emphasized that in our discussion of the Food Em-
ployers' Council case we have been concerned exclusively with the
question of the acceptability of arbitration procedure contained in a
union's contract with an employer as an agreed upon method for the
settlement of a jurisdictional dispute within the meaning of section
10(k). In agreeing with the majority opinion, we merely conclude that
for such arbitration procedure to be an acceptable agreed upon method
within section 10(k) the employer and all contending groups of workers
should participate. This conclusion is based on the premise that a real
jurisdictional dispute exists. There may, however, be serious question
whether in a given case a jurisdictional dispute within the meaning of
section 8(b) (4) (D) actually exists. Of course, if the Retail Clerks
Union had a right to have the disputed work assigned to its members
by virtue of its contract with the Employers' Council, then appropriate
conduct in behalf of that union's members to obtain such work would
certainly not be in violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) ; for, the National
Labor Relations Board has interpreted section 8(b) (4) (D) to exclude
27M Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1198, n. 5.
27 Ibid.
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the claim of a union to certain work based on a clear manifestation of
contractual right as well as such claims based on an "order or certifica-
tion of the Board" as specified in section 8(b) (4) (D). And, it would
appear, that the decision of the Supreme Court in the recent Columbia
Broadcasting System case, 2 75 in which the Court instructed the National
Labor Relations Board to make affirmative rather than negative de-
terminations in jurisdictional dispute cases, would not affect the Board's
policy that a dispute is not jurisdictional within the meaning of section
8(b) (4) (D) if the union charged with violating section 8(b) (4) (D)
has a clear contractual right to the work sought by another group of
workers. If contractual agreements are to have binding effect, it would
be clear that in such a case a jurisdictional dispute, determinable within
the meaning of section 10(k), could not exist merely because one group
or union sought to invade the contractual domain of another group or
union. We wish to emphasize, however, that in cases where the claim
of a union or group of workers to disputed work is neither clearly
expressed nor implied in its contract with the employer, it would not
appear that a clause in such contract providing for private arbitration
of contractual disputes would render any greater certainty to that part
of the contract pertaining to the disputed work. It would seem to fol-
low, therefore, that the rights of any group claiming an arbitrable
right to disputed work by virtue of its contract with the employer would
not be detrimentally affected by the participation in the arbitration pro-
ceeding of the other group or groups asserting a claim to the disputed
work, if the group claiming the arbitrable right is correct that a reason-
able interpretation of its contract would favor an assignment of the
work to its members. On the other hand, if the group, asserting its
claim to disputed work to be arbitrable within the terms of its collective
bargaining contract, is unreasonable in its interpretation of the contract
pertaining to the assignment of work, then it would also appear not to
be detrimental to its cause that the arbitration proceeding in which it
asserted its claim involved a third or fourth party. The difficulty in such
cases is that if a union charged with forcing an assignment of work as
proscribed by section 8(b) (4) (D) is correct in its contractual claim
to the disputed work, then, the preliminary investigation of the National
Labor Relations Board should reveal this fact and neither a private nor
a governmental determination of any jurisdictional dispute under sec-
tion 10(k) would be necessary.
In the Pulitzer Publishing Company case,276 the National Labor Re-
lations Board again had occasion to consider the problem concerning
275 N.L.R.B. v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, 364
U.S. 573 (1961).
276 Local 4, I.B.E.W., A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Pulitzer Publishing Co.) 129 N.L.R.B. No.
118, 47 L.R.R.M. 1106 (1960).
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the applicability of an arbitration provision contained in the collective
bargaining contract of a union which claimed work assigned by the
employer to members of two other labor organizations. The dispute in-
volved the employer's assignment of work in operating a tape recording
machine which was used by the employer's television and radio stations.
The employer assigned various phases of the operation of the machine
to members of three unions, namely, the Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.),
the Musicians Union, and the Newspaper Guild. The I.B.E.W. claimed
that certain functions assigned to members of the other unions should
have been assigned to its members "and sought to invoke the arbitration
clauses of its contractual grievance procedure." There was no work
stopage, but the I.B.E.W. started an action in federal court to enforce
the arbitration provision of its contract. The Company charged the
union with a violation of section 8(b) (4) (i) (D) which served to invoke
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board under section
10(k). The I.B.E.W. sought to have the 10(k) proceedings dismissed
"alleging that (1) the disputed work of library filing, indexing, and
record keeping is covered by its contract (2) the company has refused
to arbitrate the issue, and (3) the union has filed suit in federal court to
compel arbitration." 27 7 The Board held that the contract between
I.B.E.W. and the employer did "not, in unambiguous terms, include
the work of library filing, indexing and record keeping. '27 In reply to
the I.B.E.W.'s contention that the arbitration procedure specified in its
collective bargaining contract should be invoked, the Board stated:
"The IBEW . . .contests the Board's jurisdiction in this case on the
grounds, among others, that the arbitration provisions of its contract
with the Company provide a method for adjustment of the dispute. We
find no merit in this contention. For, assuming applicability of the
arbitration clauses (a question we need not decide), it is clear that
neither the Musicians nor the Guild would be bound by any award
issued thereunder.'" 279 The Board leaves no doubt after its decisions in
the Food Employer's Council and Pulitzer Publishing' Company cases
that a union involved in a dispute with another labor group or groups
over the right to an assignment of work cannot utilize arbitration pro-
cedure set forth in its contract with the employer to settle the dispute as
if it were exclusively a matter between itself and the employer. If the
contract between a union and an employer is either silent or unclear
with respect to an assignment of jurisdictionally disputed work, arbi-
277 Id. 47 L.R.R.M. at 1108.
27S Ibid.
Ibid. At this point the Board cites as authority: Local 375, Teamsters Union,(Service Transport Co.) 113 N.L.R.B. 452, 36 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1955); Local
48, Sheet Metal Workers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Aconsti Engineering Co.) 119
N.L.R.B. 157, 41 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1957); Local 770, Retail Clerks Union,
A.F.L.-C.I.O. et al., (Food Employers' Council, Inc.), supra note 264.
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tration procedure specified in the contract for the settlement of con-
tractual disputes does not qualify as a "satisfactory" method for the
settlement of the jurisdictional dispute unless all the parties, including
the other disputing labor group or groups, agree to participate in the
private arbitration.
Another problem involved in the acceptability of an agreement by
the parties to settle their own jurisdictional dispute concerns the method
or procedure of the parties' participation. Does such participation have
to be direct, express, or simultaneous? The National Labor Relations
Board has answered each of the three parts of this question in the
negative, and has found "satisfactory evidence" of an agreement within
section 10(k) by the parties to settle a jurisdictional dispute even
though the participation of one or more of them is indirect, implied,
and not simultaneous. Thus, an international union organization has
been said to be a participant in an agreed upon method for settling a
jurisdictional dispute because of its membership in the A.F.L.-C.I.O. 2 0
Such participation in the procedure of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s private tri-
bunal-the National Joint Board-for the determination of jurisdic-
tional disputes could be considered indirect. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board has also held that the "Carpenters International was bound,
by its membership in the Building and Construction Trades Department,
AFL-CIO, which is a signatory to the Plan for Settling Jurisdictional
Disputes.... to accept and comply with decision of the Joint Board. ' 281
And, in the often cited A.W. Lee case,2 2 the N.L.R.B. in holding that
the Lathers' International, as a member of the Building and Construc-
tion Trades Department of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., was a participant in its
Joint Board determinations went on to conclude as having "no merit"
the contention of the local Lathers Union "that it did not become sub-
ject to the Joint Board agreement by virtue of the fact that he Lathers'
International was a party to it, and that a local union cannot be bound
by the agreement without its express consent .... ,,283 Therefore, just as
international union organizations affiliated with the A.F.L.-C.I.O. are
parties to an agreed procedure of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. for the settlement of
28o Finding the international organizations of the Carpenters and Lathers to be
parties to the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s plan for arbitrating jurisdictional disputes in
the construction trades, the N.L.R.B. stated: "Accordingly, we find that both
these Internationals and their subordinate affiliates, including Lathers 46, are
bound by the Plan notwithstanding the efforts of the Lathers International to
disassociate itself therefrom." Local 46, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Build-
ing Trades Employers Assn. of Long Island) 120 N.L.R.B. 837, 42 L.R.R.M.
1060, 1061 (1958). See also, Local 46, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Jacobson
& Co.) 119 N.L.R.B. 1658, 41 L.R.R.M. 1367 (1958) and Local 2, Lathers
Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Acoustical Contractors Assn. of Cleveland), supra note
246.
281 Local 46, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Jacobson & Co.), supra note 280, at
1369.
282 Supra note 246.
283 Id. 36 L.R.R.M. at 1415.
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jurisdictional disputes so also are local unions parties to such procedure
through their affiliation with the international organizations. In the A.
W. Lee case, the N.L.R.B. referred to the Constitution of the Lathers'
International which gave it "decisional rights in jurisdictional matters"
and authorized it "to bind its locals to the official method for deciding
jurisdictional disputes adopted by all of the International Unions of
the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL.' 28 4 In
the Meyer Furnace case, 28 5 the N.L.R.B. again stated that each of the
disputing unions was a party "to an agreed upon method for adjustment
of jurisdictional disputes within ... Section 10(k) by virtue of the fact
that the Internationals of both unions (were) signatories to the joint
Board agreement." 286
In the Win. F. Traylor case,287 the National Labor Relations Board
recognized the voluntary participation by a union in a method for settl-
ing jurisdictional disputes which had been set forth in a contract be-
tween the employer and another union. The contract between the em-
ployer and the union prescribed that jurisdictional disputes would be
settled by the business agents of the unions involved. It is obvious that
such an agreement could, in the beginning, be contractually binding only
upon the employer and the one union; it could not bind any union which
may in the future be involved in a jurisdictional dispute with the first
union unless the second chose to comply with the prescribed procedure.
The N.L.R.B. recognized this when it stated: "Originally, only the Com-
pany and Local 934 were bound by the agreement because it was part of
their contract and because the nature of the agreement itself also neces-
sarily confined it to, and could only bind, these two parties. However,
by apparently acting pursuant to the agreement.. ., Local 236 (the union
subsequently involved in the dispute) has demonstrated that it con-
siders that it too is bound by the agreement."
288
Participation by employers in agreements to settle jurisdictional dis-
putes has its own special problems. Just as a union may be a party to an
agreed upon method to settle a jurisdictional dispute because of its
affiliation with a regional or national labor organization so also may
an employer become a participant through membership in an association
284 Id. at 1416. It should be noted that the facts in the Lee case occurred before
formation of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.
2S5 Local 1, Sheet Metal Workers Union, (Meyer Furnace Co.) 114 N.L.R.B.
924, 37 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1955).
986 Id. 37 L.R.R.M. at 1069. See also, the Jacobson & Co. case, supra note 280,
wherein the Board in referring to the Acoustical Contractors case, supra note
246, stated "that the Lathers International, by retaining membership in the
Building Trades Department, AFL-CIO, 'continued to subject itself and its
locals to all constitutional requirements of Department membership, including
the requirement that it recognize and be bound by the joint Board agreement.
28'7 " 41 L.R.R.M. at 1369.
287 Supra note 256.
288 Id. 29 L.R.R.M. at 1189, n. 10.
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of employers. However, as is probably more often the case, the employer
may participate in a private settlement of a jurisdictional dispute on
his own. One thing is quite clear. Participation by the employer is neces-
sary to the acceptability of a private agreement to adjust a jurisdictional
dispute within the meaning of section 10(k). In the Bay Counties Dis-
trict Council case 28 9 the N.L.R.B. had exercised jurisdiction under
section 10(k) to hear and determine a jurisdictional dispute on the
charge of one union (the Roofers) that another union (the Carpenters)
was forcing certain employers to assign work as prohibited by section
8(b) (4) (D). The employers were not served by the regional director
with formal notice of the 10(k) hearing and were, therefore, not parties
to the action. They did, however, appear as witnesses at the hearing
and entered no objection at not being served with notice. The N.L.R.B.,
in asserting that the employer is a necessary party to a hearing con-
ducted by the Board under section 10(k), stated its position as follows:
Since rival unions involved in a jurisdictional dispute cannot
adjust their dispute over a work assignment or agree upon a
method of voluntary adjustment of the dispute without the con-
sent of the employer responsible for the work assignment, it
follows that Section 10(k) contemplates a participation of the
employer in the proceeding as a necessary party. Although a
Board determination in a 10(k) proceeding is not directed
against the employer, it contains a determination that the union
charged with unfair labor practices is or is not lawfully entitled
to force or require the employer to assign the disputed work to
one group of employees rather than to another. Such determina-
tion, therefore, vitally affects the employer's prerogative to make
work assignments.
290
When the N.L.R.B., however, held in the Bay Counties District
Council case that the error of not serving the employers with notice of
the 10(k) hearing was not prejudicial, because the employers knew
about the proceeding and elected not to intervene, one of the Board
members dissented:
The majority's approach fails to recognize the Board's function as
an arbitrator in a 10(k) proceeding .... The 10(k) proceeding
... is in the nature of compulsory arbitration, where the arbitra-
tion tribunal, before it can proceed with the determination of the
dispute must obtain jurisdiction over all of the parties to the
dispute either by their voluntary submission or by service of
process on such parties. . . . The majority decision also gives
lip service to the second objective of Section 10(k), namely, to
encourage the voluntary settlement of jurisdictional disputes by
the parties themselves .... (U)nless the employer involved in the
dispute is made a party to the 10(k) proceeding, no full and real
289 Bay Counties Dist. Council, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Local 40, United Roofers Union)
115 N.L.R.B. 1757, 38 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1956).290 Id. 38 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
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opportunity is afforded the competing unions either to adjust the
dispute or agree upon a method for the voluntary adjustment of
the dispute.... As an employer's non-participation in such a pro-
ceeding may ultimately prejudice the possibility of a voluntary
adjustment of a jurisdictional dispute, his election to intervene
or not intervene in the proceeding is of no legal significance, and
does not relieve the Board from its obligation under the Act to
afford the parties to the dispute a real oportunity to settle the
dispute without the Board's intervention.291
Apparently, the dissenting position in the Bay Counties District Council
case is based on the premise that the exercise of jurisdiction by a judi-
cial or administrative tribunal of government is an incentive to the
parties involved in the case to reach a settlement on their own rather
than risk losing the case. Of course, as a practical mater, governmental
intervention can, and does, have this effect. The dissenting position,
therefore, is that the employer should not be allowed the choice of not
participating in a 10(k) proceeding, and that, with the employer re-
quired to participate, there would be greater incentive for the employer
to promote a settlement between the two disputing unions. The diffi-
culty with this view, despite its practical advantages, is that in the Bay
Counties case the National Labor Relations Board had exercised its
jurisdiction under section 10(k) because one union had charged an-
other union with forcing certain employers to assign work contrary to
the provisions of section 8(b) (4) (D). Since an employer did not initi-
ate the unfair labor practice charge in the Bay Counties case and since
the prohibition of section 8(b) (4) (D) involves union conduct exclu-
sively, it is not easy to conclude that employers, who elect not to inter-
vene as parties in a 10(k) proceeding, are nevertheless required to do
so for the purpose of encouraging the employer and unions involved in
a jurisdictional dispute to adjust their own difficulties. Despite the
merits of promoting private settlement of jurisdictional disputes, neither
section 8(b)(4)(D) nor section 10(k) would appear to compel an
employer to participate in a 10(k) proceeding instigated by a union's
charge that another union has engaged in an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor
practice.
Although the National Labor Relations Board has held that an
employer is not bound by an arbitration agreement which the employer
has not signed, "2 ' the general rule to which the Board subscribes recog-
291 Id. at 1174.
292 In the General Riggers case, the N.L.R.B. in finding that there was "no agreed
upon method for voluntarily adjusting jurisdictional disputes such as would
free this Board from the mandate to hear and determine the dispute," empha-
sized that the employer was "not a signatory to the Dunlop Award relating to
the disputed work." Local 1102, Millwrights Union, (General Riggers &
Erectors, Inc.) 127 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 45 L.R.R.M. 1494, 1495 (1960). And, in
the Painting & Decorating Contractors case, the N.L.R.B. in noting that
"[t]he National Joint Board agreement specifically provides that only those
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nizes that an employer may be a participant in private arbitration pro-
cedure through indirection or implication. Even when the N.L.R.B.
found that neither an employers' association nor a member thereof was
bound by a decision of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board, since there
was no evidence that either the association or the employer had "signed
a stipulation" as specified in the National Joint Board agreement, the
N.L.R.B. emphasized the importance of implied participation in a pri-
vate method of settling jurisdictional disputes by considering in the
same case the question of whether the employer's "cooperation" with
the private tribunal of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. was a manifestation of consent
by the employer to abide by its decision. 293
The Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company case 294 is one example of the
time and manner of employer participation in a pre-existing method
for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes. The dispute involved the
Glaziers and Iron Workers Unions which had through their interna-
tional organizations agreed to submit their jurisdictional problem to
the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board for resolution. The employer, the
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, signed a purchase order agreeing to
settlement of jurisdictional disputes by the Joint Board. The National
Labor Relations Board said:
In the present case, the the record clearly discloses, and we find,
that all parties agreed to such a method for voluntary adjustment.
By signing the ... subcontract, it is clear Pittsburgh committed
itself to all the terms contained therein .... It may be noted that
the language of Section 10(k) does not require, and the Board
has never held, that the agreed-upon method envisaged by that
section be set forth in a single instrument, signed by all the
parties to the dispute. Indeed, as the chairman of the Joint Board
... testified, jurisdictional agreements between trade unions are
virtually always signed only by the disputing unions, and not by
the employers involved, who agree to be bound thereunder in
separate instruments, as here, or by various other means.29 5
contractors are bound who 'have signed a stipulation' to that effect," went on
to hold that the employer "was not bound by the Joint Board's determination
because of his membership in the Painting & Decorating Contractors Associa-
tion," and that there was no evidence that the employer, "or the Painting &
Decorating Contractors Association on its behalf with authority to do so, had
signed such a stipulation." Local 450, Operating Engineers Union, A.F.L.-
C.I.O., (Painting & Decorating Contractors) 119 N.L.R.B. 1725, 41 L.R.R.M.
1399, 1401 (1958).
293 Local 450, Operating Engineers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Painting & Decorating
Contractors), supra note 292.
294 Local 25, Iron Workers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.)
125 N.L.R.B. 1035, 45 L.R.R.M. 1221 (1959).
295 Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1222, 1223. [Italics supplied.] See also, Local 1102, Mill-
wrights Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Don Cartage Co) 121 N.L.R.B. 101, 42 L.R.R.M.
1295 (1958), wherein the N.L.R.B. noted: "Before and since Riggers Local
575 . . . contract with the Company, it and Local 1105 were bound by agree-
ment to settle their jurisdictional dispute in accordance with the Dunlop deci-
sion. While the Company was not initially a party to such agreement, it later,
within ten days of its filing the charge, did sign an agreement recognizing
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The A. W. Lee case296 illustrates employer participation in a volun-
tary settlement through submission or acquiescence. In this case, the
employer was engaged in the installation of acoustical ceiling at a
project for Westinghouse. The employer assigned the suspension sys-
tem work to the( Lathers Union and the work of inserting tiles to the
Carpenters. The Carpenters submitted the work dispute over the sus-
pension system to private settlement by the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board.
When the Joint Board requested the employer to submit a description
of the work and the details of the dispute, the employer complied; and,
when the employer received a telegram from the Joint Board that the
installation of the framework as well as the tiles, at the Westinghouse
project only, should be done by the Carpenters, the employer complied
by assigning the disputed work to the Carpenters. On the same day,
Local 9 of the Lathers called a strike of twenty-three lathers on nine
of the employer's jobs in protest. The Lathers went back to work pur-
suant to an agreement reached in the course of a section 10(L) proceed-
ing. The issue concerning a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) was never-
theless present, and the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board to determine the dispute under section 10(k) was invoked. The
Board, however, refused to hear the dispute on the ground that the
parties had agreed to their own method of adjustment. Despite the fact
that employers in the construction trades, to be bound by decisions of the
A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board, are supposed to sign the agreement with
the Building and Construction Trades Department of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.
by which the Joint Board was authorized to determine jurisdictional
disputes, the employer in the Lee case did not do so. The N.L.R.B. put
greater emphasis on the conduct of the employer and held:
It is true, as contended by Lathers Local 9, that the Company
had never signed any stipulation such as specified (by Article II,
sec. 7 of the Joint Board agreement) and was therefore not con-
tractually bound by the Joint Board agreement at the time the
dispute arose. The Company did, however, submit itself to the
Joint Board's processes by replying to requests for information,
by requesting reconsideration of the Joint Board's initial deci-
sion. . ., and by requesting the Joint Board to intervene to stop
the Lather's work stoppage which was occasioned by the Com-
pany's compliance with the Joint Board decision. It is also true
that the Company had acquiesced in Joint Board control of work
disputes on its jobs .... In view of these facts .... we find that
the Company had, at the time of the charge herein 'agreed upon
a method for the voluntary adjustment of the dispute.'297
the applicability of the Dunlop decision to the work in dispute and agreeing
to be bound by the terms of the Dunlop decision. . . ." 42 L.R.R.M. at 1296.
296 Local 9, Lathers Union, A.F.L., (A. W. Lee, Inc.) 113 N.L.R.B. 947, 36 L.R.
R.M. 1414 (1955).
297 Id. 36 L.R.R.M. at 1416.
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In the Meyer Furnace case2 98 the National, Labor Relations Board
again stressed the importance of employer participation in a private
method of settling a jurisdictional dispute through implication rather
than expression. The Board in that case held: "Meyer, the employer
responsible for the assignment of the disputed work here, has sub-
mitted itself to the Joint Board's processes by its submission of the
dispute to that body. Under these circumstances it is unnecessary that
Meyer be a signatory to the Joint Board agreement in order for Meyer
to be deemed to have agreed upon a method for voluntary adjustment
within the meaning of Section 10(k). ' 299
Although the National Labor Relations Board has been satisfied
within the terms of section 10(k) that the parties to a jurisdictional
dispute have agreed by implication to resolve their differences, this does
not mean that the Board finds such agreement among the parties in
every case where there is a contention that the parties have settled, or
agreed to settle, their problem. The Board has in a number of cases
accepted jurisdiction to hear and determine jurisdictional disputes under
section 10(k) on the ground that there was no "satisfactory evidence"
that the parties had agreed to a voluntary method of adjustment. 30 0 The
Board has been quite insistent, despite its desire to imply an agreement
of settlement by the parties, that the implication of an agreement by
the parties to adjust their dispute be supported by the eidence. In the
Jacksonville Tile Company case30 1 one of the disputing unions claimed
that the employer had submitted for settlement a jurisdictional dispute
to the processes of the National Joint Board of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. The
N.L.R.B. observed that the record was silent with respect to the char-
acter of the information submitted by the employer and silent as to the
298 Supra note 285.
299 Id. 37 L.R.R.M. at 1069. See also, Local 46, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O.,(Building Trades Employers Assn. of Long Island), supra note 280, wherein
the N.L.R.B. held: "Because [the employer] submitted the dispute to the Joint
Board in the first instance, and ultimately assigned the work in question in
the manner decided by the Joint Board, we find, in accordance with precedent
that [the employer], too, has agreed upon a voluntary method for the adjust-
ment of the dispute herein, namely, the Joint Board procedures." 42 L.R.R.M.
at 1061.
300 In the Pittsburgh's Great Southern Shoppers Mart case, for example, the
Board observed that "there was no showing ... that the contractors .. .are
parties to any agreement to be bound by determinations of the Joint Board,[of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.] or that they have submitted to the Joint Board's pro-
cesses, as the employer in the Lee case . . .had done." Local 5, I.B.E.W.,(Pittsburgh's Great So. Shoppers Mart) 115 N.L.R.B. 1196, 38 L.R.R.M.
1020, 1021 (1956). See also, Operating Engineers Union, (Flhoro Electric
Corporation), supra note 260; Local 386, Teamsters Union, (John M. King
Co.) 124 N.L.R.B. No. 183, 45 L.R.R.M. 1012 (1959) ; Local 59, Lathers Union,
A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Jacksonville Tile Co.), supra note 257; Locals 17, 17A, & 17B,
Operating Engineers Union, A.F.L., (Empire State Painting & Waterproofing
Co.) 99 N.L.R.B. 1481, 30 L.R.R.M. 1199 (1952); and Local 581, Carpenters
Union, (Ora Collard) 98 N.L.R.B. 346, 29 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1952).
so Supra note 257.
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circumstances involved. The Board then held: "We are not convinced
that the mere submission of unidentified 'information,' under unknown
circumstances, is sufficient to establish that Jacksonville agreed to an
adjustment of the work by the Joint Board." 302
In the Painting & Decorating Contractors case,303 the National
Labor Relations Board had occasion to consider the effect of an em-
ployer's "cooperation" with the efforts of a private tribunal in adjusting
a jurisdictional dispute in which the employer was involved. Concern-
ing the employer's "cooperation in supplying the Joint Board with in-
formation requested by it and the fact that it did not object to the joint
Board's assumption of jurisdiction over the work dispute until after
the Joint Board made its award," the N.L.R.B. stated "we are not con-
vinced that such cooperation is sufficient to establish that (the employer)
thereby agreed to an adjustment of the work dispute by the Joint
Board. ' 30 4 And, in another case,30 5 in which a disputing union claimed
the employer, a subcontractor, was bound by a previous determination
of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s joint Board involving the prime contractor and
by the current joint Board's determination in its favor, the National
Labor Relations Board disagreed: "The Company here cannot be bound
by any prior determination to which it was not a party. Nor is it bound
by the determination of the Joint Board in this particular dispute since
the evidence falls short of establishing that it ever submitted, or ac-
quiesced in the submission of, the dispute to the Joint Board. In fact
the evidence is to the contrary." 00 The N.L.R.B. distinguished the
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company case, °0 in which an employer became
involved in the procedure of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board through
a subcontract, on the ground that in that case "the subcontract expressly
stated it was 'subject to conditions on the reverse side' of the purchase
order contract, and such purchase order contract included an agreement
to be bound by the Joint Board."308
302 Id. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1068. At this point the Board cites as authority the Paint-
ing & Decorating Contractors case, supra note 292.3o3 Supra note 292.
304 Id. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1401. The Board distinguished the Lee case, supra note
296, and the Meyer case, supra note 285, as follows: "In the Lee case, this
Board found that the employer had submitted to the Joint Board's processes
because, among other things, the employer had fully complied with the Joint
Board's decision, requested the Joint Board to intervene to halt the union's
work stoppage, requested it to reconsider its initial decision, and previously
acquiesced in the Joint Board's control of its job. In the Meyer Furnace case,
the employer submitted to the Joint Board's processes by itself submitting the
dispute to the Joint Board for its determination. It is clear that the facts
which persuaded the Board to find a voluntary submission in the decided cases
are absent in the present case." 41 L.R.R.M. at 1401.
305 Operating Engineers Union, (Fluoro Electric Corporation) 128 N.L.R.B. No.
88, 46 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1960).
300 Id. 46 L.R.R.M. at 1378.
307 Supra note 294.
308 Id. 46 L.R.R.M. at 1378, n. 5.
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Another version of an employer's "cooperation" with the activities
of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board was involved in the Contractors
Association of New Jersey case.309 Among other things, the case in-
volved a request by an employers' association that the Joint Board
advise it concerning the effect of an assignment of work to the Operat-
ing Engineers Union. When the Joint Board refused to advise the asso-
ciation but offered instead to decide the actual dispute, the association
did not reply. The National Labor Relations Board did not "believe that
the Association's request for an advisory opinion constitute[d] a volun-
tary submission of the dispute within the meaning of section 10(k) in
view of the fact that the Association did not accept the offer of the Joint
Board to submit the dispute." 310
The problem of the extent to which an employer is obliged to submit
a current jurisdictional dispute to private adjustment on the basis of his
submission of such previous disputes to private arbitration is indeed a
diffcult one. Two cases are illustrative. In the W. H. Condo case,"1 '
the question was whether an employer, Condo, and an association of
contractors had agreed because of previous conduct to submit a juris-
dictional dispute to the A.F.L.-C.I.O's Joint Board. The National Labor
Relations Board stated: "The fact that the Association, (of employers)
some nine months prior to the picketing at the high school and Union
Electric projects, sought assistance of the Joint Board is not sufficient
to establish submission to the Joint Board's processes by the Associa-
tion or Condo. Further, the fact that the general contractors on the
high school and Union Electric projects advised the Joint Board of the
dispute involving Condo (a subcontractor) cannot be regarded as a
submission to the Joint Board by Condo or the Association." 312 In the
Contractors Association of New Jersey case,313 the N.L.R.B. held that
past submission by an employers' association of jurisdictional disputes
to the Joint Board of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and past acquiescence by the
association in the decisions of the Joint Board did not give "rise to an
implied agreement to submit the instant dispute to the Joint Board."
31 4
We can conclude from the above cases on implication of participa-
tion in private arbitration procedure that the National Labor Relations
Board weighs the evidence carefully before being satisfied, within the
meaning of section 10(k), that the parties have come to an agreement
to settle their own jurisdictional dispute. Submission to a prescribed
309 Local 825, Operating Engineers Union, (Building Contractors Assn. of N.J.)
118 N.L.R.B. 978, 40 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1957).
310 Id. 40 L.R.R.M. at 1293.
311 Local 169, Carpenters Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., et al., (W. H. Condo) 119
N.L.R.B. 726, 41 L.R.R.M. 1174 (1957).
3'2 Id. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
3'- Supra note 309.
314 Id. 40 L.R.R.M. at 1293.
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procedure by which a jurisdictional dispute is to be determined outside
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board necessarily in-
volves a manifestation of intention by the parties concerned to abide by
the determination rendered pursuant to their agreement. We have seen,
for example, that the Board does not find such intention if the em-
ployer merely supplies information to a private tribunal which has
asserted jurisdiction to decide a jurisdictional dispute or if the employer
merely seeks advice from such a tribunal concerning the effect of a
proposed assignment of jurisdictionally disputed work. Submission of
a jurisdictional dispute to a private tribunal for determination, for the
purpose of pre-empting jurisdiction within the meaning of section 10 (k),
must therefore involve the purpose by all parties of complying with the
private tribunaFs determination. If the National Labor Relations Board
can reasonably conclude that the facts in a jurisdictional dispute case
expressly or impliedly support the existence of an agreement which
provides a method of voluntary adjustment, the Board is certainly moti-
vated to come to such a conclusion. On the other hand, the Board does
not, and cannot, construe the phrase "satisfactory evidence" in section
10(k) to mean equivocal or ambiguous evidence.
It might be thought that once the parties have agreed on their method
of settling future jurisdictional disputes, and have therefore agreed to
abide by the determinations pursuant thereto, subsequent problems
would not arise. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case. In
some instances, one of the parties to an agreed upon method announces
in advance of, or subsequent to, a decision of adjustment an intention
of not complying with such decision or award. The National Labor
Relations Board has consistently held that none of the parties to an
agreement for the settlement of a jurisdictional dispute can either by
declaration or disassociation avoid the obligation imposed by the agree-
ment to accept the decision rendered pursuant to the terms of the agree-
ment. The Board has had occasion to consider the problem of the
effectiveness of private awards in several leading cases. The Win. F.
Traylor case315 was one of the first important cases dealing with the
binding effect of an award made pursuant to an agreed upon method.
As we have seen,3 16 in this case the employer had agreed with a union
to let the representative of the union settle any future jurisdictional
dispute with a similar representative of whatever union would be in-
volved in the dispute. When a jurisdictional dispute did occur and was
settled by the representatives of the disputing unions, the employer re-
fused to comply with the settlement on the ground that it would require
replacement of regular employees. The question for the National Labor
315 Local 236, Teamsters Union, (Win. F. Traylor) 97 N.L.R.B. 1003, 29 L.R.R.M.
1188 (1952).3 1 6 Supra note 288.
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Relations Board was whether the employer's refusal to abide by an
award resulting from a private method of arbitration reactivated the
Board's jurisdiction to hear and determine the jurisdictional dispute
under section 10(k). If the refusal by a party to an agreed upon method
to comply with the decision rendered through private arbitration nullifies
the agreement to arbitrate, then the N.L.R.B. would be compelled to
assume jurisdiction under section 10(k) to hear and determine the
jurisdictional dispute which the private award tried to settle. The
Board's decision to decline jurisdiction in the Traylor case was based
on the following reasoning:
The fact that the Company had refused, in effect, to accept the
determination of the dispute under the agreed upon method for
adjustment is immaterial. The proviso to section 10(k), as al-
ready noted, applies equally to an adjustment or an agreement
upon a method for adjustment. Moreover to hold that the Com-
pany's refusal to abide by the determination of the dispute, made
pursuant to an agreed upon method for adjustment also nullified
the agreement upon a method for adjustment would be to con-
done and sanction the Company's breach of that agreement. This
would tend to discourage and render worthless the making of
such agreements, contrary to the statutory purpose to encourage
the voluntary adjustment of jurisdictional disputes. In effect,
such a holding would permit a party to breach such an agreement
with impunity because the determination of the dispute pursuant
to the agreement was unfavorable to. it, and then have recourse
to this Board for another determination of the dispute which
might be favorable to it. In our opinion, this would ... abuse
... the Board's process.317
In several cases,318 the National Labor Relations Board considered
the efforts of the Lathers Union to disassociate itself from the A.F.L.-
C.I.O.'s program for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes in the
construction trades. In the A. W. Lee case,319 the Board held: "The
fact that Lathers Local 9 has refused to abide by the determination, in
derogation of its agreement, is, in our opinion, immaterial. As previ-
ously noted, the proviso to Section 10(k) applies equally to adjustment
or an agreement upon a method of adjustment. Otherwise, any party
adversely affected by a determination made pursuant to the agreement
could breach the agreement with impunity, and then have recourse to
this Board for a redetermination of the dispute, in the hope that the
redetermination might be favorable."32 0 In the Lee case, then, the Board
3 Id. 29 L.R.R.M. at 1189.
318 Local 46, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Building Trades Employers Assn. of
Long Island), supra notes 280, 299; Local 2, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O.,
(Acoustical Contractors Assn. of Cleveland), 119 N.L.R.B. 1345, 41 L.R.R.M.
1293 (1958) ; Local 46, Lathers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Jacobson & Co.), supra
notes 280, 286; and Local 9, Lathers Union, A.F.L., (A. W. Lee, Inc.), supra
note 296.319 Supra note 296.
320 Id. 36 L.R.R.M. at 1416.
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takes the logical position that an agreement among the parties to abide
by a private determination of their jurisdictional dispute does not be-
come non-existent upon the election of noncompliance by the party
whose interests were not favored by the private award. In the Meyer
Furnace case 3 21 the National Labor Relations Board was concerned
with what it thought was an expression of intent not to accept the re-
sults of private arbitration before there had been a determination by the
method prescribed by the parties' agreement. The Board found in the
Meyer case that the local unions involved in the jurisdictional dispute
had agreed through their international organizations to abide by the
decision of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Joint Board. Before the Joint Board had
made its determination of the dispute, the Pipefitters Union had ex-
pressed its contention that no method of settlement had been agreed
upon by the parties and that the Joint Board, therefore, had no jurisdic-
tion to decide the controversy. The N.L.R.B. addressed itself to the
Pipefitters' contention as follows: "In asserting this position, the Pipe-
fitters appears to be announcing in advance that it will not abide by any
determination of the dispute made by the Joint Board. In the Lee case
... [w]e said that the Respondent's refusal to 'abide by the determina-
tion, in derogation of its agreement, [was] . . . immaterial.' We find,
therefore, that despite the Pipefitters' contention, it is a party to an
agreed upon method for determining this dispute.
322
In the Acoustical Contractors Associationj of Cleveland case,32 the
National Labor Relations Board summarized its views on the binding
effect of a private determination in settlement of' a jurisdictional dis-
pute:
To construe the Act so that a party dissatisfied with the agreed
upon method can have an alternative tribunal-this Board-
either to redetermine an adverse decision or pass upon the matter
in advance of an unexpected adverse decision, is to frustrate the
Congressional purpose of placing initial reliance upon voluntary
agreements to settle jurisdictional strife.... On the other hand,
the Congressional purpose is clearly enhanced by a construction
of the Act which does not countenance 'forum shopping' in the
face of a private 'agreed upon method of adjustment,' which
321 Supra notes 285, 298.
322 Id. 37 L.R.R.M. at 1070 [Italics supplied.] See also, Local 1102, Millwrights
Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Don Cartage Co.) supra note 295, wherein the N.L.R.B.
stated: "Nor does the fact that Riggers Local 575 disagreed with the decision
of its International Union that under the Dunlop decision the work in dispute
belonged to millvrights, or that the Company might, despite its ... Affidavit
of Agreement, refuse to follow the agreed upon methods of settlement, alter
the situation. We have held in view of the terms of Section 10(k) that neither
the announcement in advance of a party to an agreed upon method for set-
tlement that it does not intend to comply with the determination resulting
therefrom, [citing the Meyer Furnace case] nor its subsequent failure to
abide by the determination citing [Lee and Traylor cases] gives the Board
power to determine the dispute." 42 L.R.R.M. at 1296.
32sSupra note 318.
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keeps an 8(b) (4) (D) charge alive pending actual settlement of
a jurisdictional dispute, and which, where the private adjustment
machinery has broken down, provides a Board cease and desist
order to stop a jurisdictional strike.3 24
In considering the subject of an agreement by parties to settle their
own jurisdictional dispute, the question might arise as to the means by
which such "agreement" was reached. The problem concerns the ele-
ment of voluntary participation which is inherent in the term "agree-
ment." Real agreement, of course, is said to be a meeting of the minds.
This is a- basic principle of the law of contracts. Yet, when it comes
to agreements to adjust an existing jurisdictional dispute, the employer
is often confronted with a strike or picketing to "encourage" his par-
ticipation in an agreement to settle the dispute. The National Labor
Relations Board was requested to decide whether an employer's partici-
pation under such circumstances was really "voluntary" within the
meaning of section 10(k). In the Don Cartage Company case,325 the
Board answered this question in the following manner: "The fact that
the Company agreed upon this method of voluntary adjustment of the
dispute in the midst of picket line activity does not detract from the
force of the agreement insofar as the Board's power to determine the
dispute is concerned. Section 10(k) necessarily assumes the existence
of activities prohibited by Section 8(b) (4) (D) but nevertheless clearly
provides for the voluntary settlement of jurisdictional difference with-
out governmental intervention.
3 26
In its effort to uphold the validity of agreements to settle jurisdic-
tional disputes by private arbitration, and therefore forestall its juris-
diction to determine such disputes, the National Labor Relations Board
has given what could be considered a rather liberal interpretation to
that part of section 10(k) which allows the parties ten days to submit
evidence to the Board that they have reached an agreement by which
they have settled, or will settle, their jurisdictional problem. The lan-
guage of section 10(k) is clear. The Board is to hear and determine
a jurisdictional dispute upon the filing of a charge of an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) "unless, within ten days
after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute
submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or
agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute."
When a company conceded' the existence of an agreement for the vol-
untary settlement of a jurisdictional dispute but contended that the
agreement was not effective because it was not brought to the attention
of the Board within the prescribed period of ten days after the filing
of the 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice charge, the Board replied that
324 Id. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1298 [Italics supplied.]
225 Supra notes 295, 322.
226 Id. 42 L.R.R.M. at 1296.
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it "has not so construed the provisions of Section 10(k), nor would
it be reasonable to adopt such a construction of procedural language
to override the plain purport of the substantive provisions in Section
10(k) favoring voluntary methods for adjustment of jurisdictional dis-
putes." 327
It would seem appropriate at this point to consider, the role of the
National Labor Relations Board in the determination of the existence
of either an agreement by the parties to have their jurisdictional dispute
settled through private arbitration or an actual adjustment by the parties
which would, as we have seen, dismiss the 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor
practice charge itself. As we have also observed, the existence of either
the adjustment or method of adjustment is exceedingly important since
the Board's decision to exercise jurisdiction under section 10(k) de-
pends upon its satisfaction that the evidence does not reveal that the
parties have so adjusted, or agreed to adjust, their dispute. This func-
tion of the Board in determining adjustment, or an agreement to adjust,
is quite judicial in character and is fundamentally a question of contract
law. Traditionally, the determination of whether persons are parties to,
and- bound by, agreements is a judicial, rather than an administrative,
function. The problem of determining the existence of a voluntary ad-
justment of a jurisdictional dispute might concern not only the question
of whether the parties have come to an agreement to settle the dispute
but also whether the agreement is contractually binding. This involves
the law of consideration. Of course, an employer and a labor union
would be contractually obligated if their agreement to arbitrate juris-
dictional disputes was in their collective bargaining contract. But, what
about the subsequent promise of a disputing union to join in their agree-
ment to arbitrate? Is such a promise supported by consideration? Also,
two or more labor unions might be contractually obligated to follow a
prescribed arbitration procedure which is a part of the terms of mem-
bership in their national labor organization. But, what about the subse-
quent promise of an employer to participate in such arbitration proce-
dure? Is such a promise contractually binding? Of course, in either of
these instances, there might very well be additional consideration to
support these subsequent promises by third parties to join a pre-existing
arbitration agreement. As far as section 10(k) is concerned, the ques-
tion of the contractual character of an agreement by the parties to settle
their own jurisdictional dispute appears to be more academic than real.
Section 10 (k) specifies that either an adjustment of a jurisdictional dis-
pute by the parties, or their agreeing upon a method for such adjust-
ment, is sufficient to deprive the National Labor Relations Board of
jurisdiction to intervene. The Act does not refer to the contractual na-
327 Local 25, Iron Workers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.),
supra note 294, 45 L.R.R.M. at 1222, n. 4.
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ture of the adjustment or the agreement to adjust. And, it would seem,
an agreement by the parties to settle their jurisdictional dispute would
be sufficient to prevent intervention by the Board even though the
agreement is non-contractual.
CONCLUSION
The role of the National Labor Relations Board in the determina-
tion of jurisdictional disputes under the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 depends on two important sections of the Act, namely,
section 8(b) (4) (D) and section 10(k). The one section-8(b) (4) (D)
-prescribes the type of unfair labor practice; the other section-10(k)
-prescribes the method of settlement. As construed by the Board, a
jurisdictional dispute does not exist if the labor group charged with
violating the Act has a right to the work in the dispute by contract or,
as the Act provides, by previous order or certification of the Board. So,
if none of the labor groups disputing an assignment of work has such
right, the dispute is determinable by the parties or the Board within
the meaning of section 10(k) upon the charge by one of the parties that
one or more of the disputing labor groups has, or is engaging in, strike
or picket activity to force an assignment of the work. However, even
though the Board is reasonably convinced the charge has merit and
therefore exercises jurisdiction under section 10(k), the Board does
not really decide the merits of the charge in a 10 (k) hearing; this would
be done if there was a subsequent unfair labor practice hearing caused
by a refusal by a party to abide by the Board's 10(k) determination.
Thus, thq purpose of the 10(k) hearing is to determine and settle the
jurisdictional dispute which has been the cause of the unfair labor prac-
tice charge. But, the Act clearly gives to the parties the prior right to
determine their own dispute since the Board cannot intervene if they
have agreed upon their method of settlement. Certainly, the recent
Supreme Court decision in the Columbia Broadcasting System case
would not disturb this important right of the parties. The Court in that
case would have the Board decide which of the competing labor unions
has the better right to the disputed work; this is designated as an
"affirmative" award. And, the decision would not compel the Board to
decide in favor of a labor group which the Board was reasonably con-
vinced had violated the Act. Consequently, it would not appear to be a
matter of great significance if the Board's determination under section
10(k) is called "negative" or "affirmative" since in either case the Board
would not determine a jurisdictional dispute in favor of a labor group
which it feels is reasonably charged with an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor
practice. If a labor union, however, charged with( an 8(b) (4) (D) un-
fair labor practice has a right by contract or Board order, then a hear-
ing and determination under section 10 (k) would be unnecessary.
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